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Abstract—The pilot spoofing attack is considered as an active
eavesdropping activity launched by an adversary during the
reverse channel training phase. By transmitting the same pilot
signal as the legitimate user, the pilot spoofing attack is able to
degrade the quality of legitimate transmission and, more severely,
facilitate eavesdropping. In an effort to detect the pilot spoofing
attack and minimize its damages, in this paper we propose a
novel random-training-assisted (RTA) pilot spoofing detection
algorithm. In particular, we develop a new training mechanism
by adding a random training phase after the conventional pilot
training phase. By examining the difference of the estimated
legitimate channels during these two phases, the pilot spoofing
attack can be detected accurately. If no spoofing attack is
detected, we present a computationally efficient channel esti-
mation enhancement algorithm to further improve the channel
estimation accuracy. If the existence of the pilot spoofing attack is
identified, a zero-forcing (ZF)-based secure transmission scheme
is proposed to protect the confidential information from the
active eavesdropper. Extensive simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed RTA scheme can achieve efficient pilot spoofing
detection, accurate channel estimation, and secure transmission.
Index Terms—Active eavesdropping, iterative least-squares,
physical layer security, pilot spoofing attack, random training.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, wireless
channel is ubiquitously accessible to both legitimate and
illegitimate users, and therefore vulnerable to security attacks
[1]. An eavesdropper within the coverage area of the legitimate
transmitter can intercept the transmitted secure information
while staying undetected. In order to maintain confidential
transmission, conventional cryptographic (encryption) tech-
niques were adopted in wireless communications aiming at
disrupting the readability of the information. In recent years,
physical layer security is emerging as an alternative approach
to prevent eavesdropping by exploiting the physical character-
istics of wireless channels.
Pioneer efforts on physical layer security were made by
Shannon [2], Wyner [3], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman
[4] from information-theoretic perspective. Based on these
works, intensive studies were devoted to the development of
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various physical layer security techniques against eavesdrop-
ping, such as artificial noise aided security techniques [5]-
[8], diversity based security approaches [9], [10], physical-
layer secret key generation methods [11], [12], and security-
oriented beamforming techniques [13]-[19]. While these phys-
ical layer security research works are focusing on protecting
the confidential information against passive eavesdropping,
pilot spoofing attack launched by an active eavesdropper arises
as a more severe threat since this attack can degrade the quality
of the legitimate transmission and, more vitally, facilitate
eavesdropping.
In [20], Zhou et al. investigated the pilot spoofing attack at
the first time and analyzed its severe consequences. The pilot
spoofing attack targets at the reverse channel training proce-
dure in the time-division duplex (TDD) multi-input single-
output (MISO) system, where a pilot-assisted channel estima-
tion approach is widely adopted. Since the pilot sequences are
publicly known in general with a given protocol or standard,
an active eavesdropper can transmit the same pilot sequence
as the legitimate receiver in the reverse channel training phase.
As a result, the channel estimation at the legitimate transmitter
is biased and contains the component of illegitimate channel.
If the legitimate transmitter designed the beamformer based on
this biased channel estimation, the transmitted signals would
turn towards the direction of the eavesdropper, which leads to
performance degradation of legitimate transmission and, more
severely, information leakage to the eavesdropper.
Being aware of the serious consequences of the pilot spoof-
ing attack, it is of significant importance and urgency for the
legitimate users to detect this type of attack and take actions
to protect the confidentiality of wireless communications in
a practical manner. In [21], Kapetanovic´ et al. proposed to
use modified phase-shift keying (PSK) symbols as pilots in
two training slots for channel estimation. The pilot spoofing
attack can be detected by examining the phase difference of
randomly chosen PSK signals in two time slots. However, in
addition to the needs of re-designing the pilot signals and
the channel estimation process, the detection performance of
this method is not very satisfactory. In [22], Xiong et al.
proposed an energy ratio detector which explores the power
difference between the channel estimations obtained at the
transmitter by uplink training and at the receiver by downlink
training. However, the training procedure with both uplink
and downlink makes this approach more complex in practical
implementation. Considering this problem, a novel approach
was proposed in [23] based solely on uplink training. The
main idea of this approach is to self-contaminate the pilot
and use the information-theoretic minimum description length
(MDL) algorithm to detect the spoofing attack. Unfortunately,
the fore-mentioned schemes can only detect the existence
of the spoofing attack but is not capable of eliminating the
serious consequences in the data transmission phase. To this
end, in [24] a two-way training detector was proposed to not
only detect the spoofing attack but also avoid the information
leakage by a secure transmission scheme. However, this two-
way approach still requires additional downlink training which
makes the protocol more complicated. Moreover, the number
of pilot signal in the downlink training session is proportional
to the number of the transmit antennas, which will reduce the
efficiency of the system.
Inspired by these studies, in this paper we propose a novel
pilot spoofing detector based solely on uplink training with
the assist of random training signals. Particularly, we develop
a new training mechanism by adding a random training phase
after the conventional pilot training phase. In the channel
estimation procedure, the legitimate user transmits two sets
of training signals sequentially, the pre-designed pilot signal
during the pilot phase and then the random signal during
the random phase. By examining the difference of estimated
legitimate channels during these two phases, a novel random-
training-assisted (RTA) detection algorithm is proposed to
identify the existence of the pilot spoofing attack. If no
spoofing attack is detected, we present a computationally
efficient channel estimation enhancement algorithm to further
improve the channel estimation accuracy. If the existence
of the pilot spoofing attack is identified, the proposed RTA
spoofing detection algorithm can obtain the estimates of both
legitimate and illegitimate channels. Based on these knowl-
edge, we also introduce a zero-forcing (ZF)-based secure
transmission method to protect the confidential information
against the active eavesdropper by maximizing the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver while forcing the
SNR at the eavesdropper to zero.
The main contributions of our work are summarized in the
following five aspects:
• We present a novel random-training-assisted (RTA)
spoofing detection algorithm which is based solely on
uplink training and does not require significant changes
on neither the design of the pilot signals nor the procedure
of the channel estimation.
• We derive the closed-form expression of the test statistic’s
probability density function (PDF) and provide theo-
retical performance analysis of the proposed spoofing
detector.
• For no spoofing attack case, a simple channel estimation
enhancement algorithm is presented in order to improve
the accuracy of the channel estimation.
• For spoofing attack case, we also introduce a ZF-based
secure transmission method to protect the confidential
information from the active eavesdropper.
• Extensive simulation results demonstrate that our pro-
posed RTA algorithm can achieve efficient pilot spoofing
detection, accurate channel estimation, as well as secure
data transmission.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
Fig. 1. The MISO wiretap channel model with uplink training scheme.
II, we introduce the signal model and illustrate the serious
consequences caused by the pilot spoofing attack. In Section
III, we develop our RTA spoofing detector elaborately and
then provide the theoretic performance analysis of it. After
introducing a channel estimation enhancement algorithm in
Section IV, a ZF-based secure transmission method is pre-
sented in section V. Simulation studies in section VI illustrate
the efficiency of our proposed RTA spoofing detector. Finally,
some conclusions are drawn in section VII.
The following notation is used throughout this paper. Bold-
face lower-case letters indicate column vectors and boldface
upper-case letters indicate matrices; C denotes the set of all
complex numbers; (·)T and (·)H denote the transpose and
transpose-conjugate operation, respectively; IL is the L × L
identity matrix; Re{·} denotes the real part of a complex
number; sgn{·} denotes zero-threshold quantization; E{·}
represents statistical expectation. Finally, | · | and ‖ · ‖ are
the scalar magnitude and vector norm, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a typical MISO wiretap system, in which the
legitimate transmitter Alice is equipped with M (M ≥ 2)
antennas and both the legitimate receiver Bob and the eaves-
dropper Eve are equipped with single antenna, as shown in Fig.
1. The legitimate Bob-to-Alice channel hB ∈ CM×1 and the
illegitimate Eve-to-Alice channel hE ∈ CM×1 are modeled as
hB =
√
αBhB , (1)
hE =
√
αEhE , (2)
respectively. Let αB and αE represent the large scale (long-
term) fading components (e.g. shadowing and path-loss)
for the legitimate and illegitimate channels, respectively.
hB,hE ∈ CM×1 denote the small scale (short-term) fad-
ing coefficients (e.g. multi-path effect), and each element of
hB,hE is circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distributed with zero-mean and unit-variance. Under the con-
dition of a TDD system, hB and hE are both reciprocal for
the uplink and downlink channels. Moreover, hB and hE are
independent from each other.
For the consideration of better performance in the legitimate
transmission, Alice adopts beamforming approach to transmit
signals in the direction that yields the best quality. In order to
design the beamformer, it is essential for Alice to acquire the
correct knowledge of hB during the reverse (uplink) training
phase, in which Bob sends the pre-designed pilot signals to
Alice. This makes the legitimate transmission under dangerous
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threat due to the pilot spoofing attack in which Eve sends the
same pilot signals.
In the following, we will first investigate the case in which
Eve does not launch the pilot spoofing attack and build the
basic signal model of channel estimation and beamforming at
Alice. Then we will describe the scenario where Eve launches
the pilot spoofing attack, illustrate the serious consequences of
it and attach urgent importance to the detection of such attack.
A. Channel Estimation and Beamforming without Spoofing
For the purpose of acquiring the CSI, Bob sends the pilot
signals b(n), n = 1, . . . , N , with power PB , N is the total
number of pilot signals. The received signal at Alice in the
nth time slot is
yA(n) =
√
PBhBb(n) + z(n), n = 1, . . . , N, (3)
where z(n) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
zero-mean and variance σ2A. We can rewrite (3) in the matrix
form as
YA =
√
PBhBb
T + Z (4)
where YA , [yA(1), . . . ,yA(N)] and b , [b(1), . . . , b(N)]T .
Knowing the pilot signals b, Alice can easily estimate the
channel hB by the least-squares approach
ĥB =
1
N
YAb
=
√
PBhB +
1
N
Zb. (5)
Then, Alice utilizes ĥB to design the beamformer w for the
downlink data transmission
w =
ĥB
‖ĥB‖
(6)
which can provide Bob with maximum receive SNR. With this
beamformer, the received signal at Bob in the nth time slot is
yB(n) =
√
PAh
H
Bws(n) + v(n) (7)
where PA is the data transmission power of Alice, s(n) is the
transmitted data, E{|s(n)|2} = 1 and v(n) is AWGN at Bob
with zero-mean and variance σ2B .
Here we use the average SNR at Bob to evaluate the
performance of legitimate transmission
SNRB = EhB
{
PA‖hHBw‖2
σ2B
}
=
PAαB
σ2B
· MNPBαB + σ
2
A
NPBαB + σ2A
(8)
whose proof is offered in the Appendix. By using a beam-
former w based on the estimated channel ĥB , the performance
of data transmission can be improved dramatically.
B. Impact of Spoofing
If Eve conducts the pilot spoofing attack by sending the
same pilot signals at the same time, the received signal at
Alice will become
yA(n) =
√
PBhBb(n)+
√
PEhEb(n)+ z(n), n = 1, . . . , N.
(9)
After rewriting it in the matrix form
YA = (
√
PBhB +
√
PEhE)b
T + Z, (10)
the estimated channel hB becomes
ĥB =
1
N
YAb
=
√
PBhB +
√
PEhE +
1
N
Zb. (11)
In general, hE and hB are not in the same direction, i.e. hE 6=
αhB (α 6= 0). If Alice still uses this contaminated/spoofed ĥB
to design the beamformer as in (6), the direction of the signals
transmitted by Alice will turn towards the direction of Eve.
Specifically, when Bob is under the spoofing attack, accord-
ing to the received signal at Bob in (7), the average SNR at
Bob has the expression as
SNRB = EhB ,hE
{
PA‖hHBw‖2
σ2B
}
=
PAαB
σ2B
· MNPBαB +NPEαE + σ
2
A
NPBαB +NPEαE + σ2A
(12)
whose proof is offered in the Appendix. Similarly, the received
signal at Eve in the nth time slot is
yE(n) =
√
PAh
H
Ews(n) + v
′(n) (13)
where v′(n) is AWGN at Eve with zero-mean and variance
σ2E . The average SNR at Eve has the expression as
SNRE = EhB ,hE
{
PA‖hHEw‖2
σ2E
}
=
PAαE
σ2E
· MNPEαE +NPBαB + σ
2
A
NPEαE +NPBαB + σ2A
(14)
whose proof can be found in the Appendix. An obvious con-
clusion is that with spoofing power PE increasing, the SNRB
will decrease while the SNRE will increase. In other words,
by launching the spoofing attack, Eve can manipulate the
channel estimation result and benefit from degrading legitimate
transmission performance as well as enhancing eavesdropping.
To illustrate the impact due to the pilot spoofing attack, we
carry out a simulation as shown in Fig. 2. In this simulation,
we set σ2A = σ
2
B = σ
2
E = 1, αB = αE = 1, PB = 10dB. The
number of pilot bits is N = 100 and the number of antennas
at Alice is set as M = 4, 8, 16, and 32, respectively. Both
theoretical results and simulation results are included.
It can be observed from Fig. 2 that the theoretical results
(the solid lines) perfectly match the simulation results (the
dashed lines). When PE increases, SNRB decreases and
the legitimate transmission performance is degraded. More
importantly, SNRE becomes larger as PE increasing, which
implies that Eve can successfully spoof Alice and eavesdrop
the transmitted information.
While the consequence of pilot spoofing attack is unbear-
able, it is of great importance that Alice and Bob identify this
type of attack and then take actions if the spoofing attack is
detected. In the following section, we will present our RTA
pilot spoofing detection scheme and provide the theoretical
performance analysis of it.
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Fig. 2. The average SNRs at Bob and Eve versus the spoofing power of Eve.
The solid lines represent the theoretical results and the dashed lines represent
the simulation results.
Fig. 3. Structure of pilot and random training signals.
III. RANDOM-TRAINING-ASSISTED PILOT SPOOFING
DETECTION
Considering the serious impact due to the pilot spoofing
attack discussed in the previous section, in this section we
will develop a novel pilot spoofing detector which is based
solely on uplink training with the assist of random training.
In particular, we develop a new training mechanism by adding
a Random Phase following the conventional Pilot Phase. For
uplink channel estimation, Bob first transmits Np pre-designed
pilot bits during the pilot phase, then sends Nr random bits
during the random phase, as illustrated in Fig. 3. While the
pilot bits are publicly known to Alice, Bob, and Eve, the
random bits are randomly generated by Bob and unknown
to neither Alice nor Eve. In the following, we will introduce
our proposed spoofing detection algorithm in detail for Pilot
Phase and Random Phase, respectively. For the convenience
of developing our scheme, we define two hypothesises: H0
denotes that there is no pilot spoofing attack; H1 denotes that
Alice and Bob are under pilot spoofing attack.
A. Pilot Phase
During the pilot phase, Bob transmits Np pilot bits, bp(n) ∈
{±1}, n = 1, . . . , Np, and Eve may transmit the same pilot
bit sequence as Bob since the pilot bit sequence is publicly
known.
Under the hypothesis of H0, the received signal at Alice in
the nth time slot is
yp(n) =
√
PBhBbp(n) + up(n), n = 1, . . . , Np, (15)
where the AWGN up(n) ∼ CN (0, σ2AIM ). Rewrite it in the
matrix form
Yp =
√
PBhBb
T
p +Up (16)
where Yp , [yp(1),yp(2), . . . ,yp(Np)] ∈ CM×Np . Then, the
channel estimation result ĥBp = 1NpYpbp under H0 is
H0 : ĥBp =
√
PBhB +
1
Np
Upbp
=
√
PBhB +△hH0Bp (17)
where△hH0Bp , 1NpUpbp is the estimation error and by central
limited theorem
△hH0Bp ∼ CN (0,
σ2A
Np
IM ). (18)
Under the hypothesis of H1, the received signal at Alice in
the nth time slot is
yp(n)=
√
PBhBbp(n)+
√
PEhEbp(n)+up(n), n = 1, . . . , Np.
(19)
Similarly, we can rewrite it in the matrix form
Yp =
√
PBhBb
T
p +
√
PEhEb
T
p +Up (20)
and the channel estimation result under H1 is
H1 : ĥBp =
√
PBhB +
√
PEhE +
1
Np
Upbp
=
√
PBhB +△hH1Bp (21)
where △hH1Bp ,
√
PEhE +
1
Np
Upbp is the estimation error.
If we consider
√
PEhE as random variable with variance
PEαEIM , then
△hH1Bp ∼ CN (0, (
σ2A
Np
+ PEαE)IM ). (22)
Comparing to (17), we can observe that the channel estimation
(21) under H1 is biased and turn towards hE due to the attack
launched by Eve.
B. Random Phase
During the random phase, Bob transmits Nr random bits
br(n) ∈ {±1} while Eve sends nothing since she does not
have any knowledge of the random bits generated by Bob.
The received signal at Alice in the nth time slot is
yr(n) =
√
PBhBbr(n) + ur(n), n = 1, . . . , Nr, (23)
where ur(n) ∼ CN (0, σ2AIM ) is the AWGN. Rewrite it in the
matrix form
Yr =
√
PBhBb
T
r +Ur (24)
where Yr , [yr(1),yr(2), . . . ,yr(Nr)] ∈ CM×Nr .
Without knowing the random bits br, we propose for Alice
to adopt the iterative least-squares (ILS) algorithm [25], [26] to
blindly estimate hB . The ILS algorithm is a blind joint symbol
detection and channel estimation algorithm without availability
of pilot signals, which has not only high accuracy but also low
complexity. The basic idea of the ILS algorithm is to iteratively
execute the symbol detection and the channel estimation until
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TABLE I
ITERATIVE LEAST-SQUARES (ILS) ALGORITHM
Input: ĥBp, Yr .
Output: ĥBr .
1) d = 0; initialize ĥ(0)
Br
= ĥBp.
2) d = d+ 1;
b̂
(d)
r = sgn
{
Re
[
(ĥ
(d−1)
Br )
H
Yr
]}
;
ĥ
(d)
Br =
1
Nr
Yrb̂
(d)
r .
3) Repeat Step 2 until ĥ(d)
Br
= ĥ
(d−1)
Br
.
convergence. In order to obtain a reliable solution, we use
the estimated channel ĥBp acquired by the pilot bits as the
initialization of the ILS algorithm. Due to the space limitation,
we would not review the ILS algorithm in detail but simply
summarize it in Table I. Superscript d denotes iteration index.
If the channel estimation result ĥBr acquired in the random
phase using ILS algorithm is accurate, then for both H0 and
H1, the channel estimation will be ĥBr = 1NrYrbTr and we
have
H0,H1 : ĥBr =
√
PBhB +
1
Nr
Urbr
=
√
PBhB +△hH0,H1Br (25)
where △hH0,H1Br , 1NrUrbTr is the estimation error and
△hH0,H1Br ∼ CN (0,
σ2A
Nr
IM ). (26)
While the channel estimation ĥBr for the random phase is
reliable under both H0 and H1, we recall that ĥBp for the
pilot phase is reliable under H0 but biased under H1. In the
following, we will develop our spoofing attack detection algo-
rithm by examining the difference of the estimated legitimate
channels during these two phases.
C. Spoofing Attack Detector
According to (17), (21) and (25), the difference between
ĥBp and ĥBr under H0 and H1 has the expression as
H0 : ĥBp − ĥBr = △hH0Bp −△hH0Br
=
1
Np
Upbp − 1
Nr
Urbr, (27)
H1 : ĥBp − ĥBr = △hH1Bp −△hH1Br
=
√
PEhE +
1
Np
Upbp − 1
Nr
Urbr.(28)
Notice that under H0 the difference contains just the noise
terms and has relatively small value, while under H1 it
has illegitimate channel component
√
PEhE and is more
significant. Based on this fact, we introduce the test statistic
as
T , ‖ĥBp − ĥBr‖2 (29)
to differentiate H0 and H1, and to implement the spoofing
attack detection. The hypothesis test problem of the detector
is
T
H0
≶
H1
γ (30)
where γ is the test threshold.
Now we attempt to provide the theoretical performance
analysis of the proposed spoofing detector in (30) and de-
termine appropriate test threshold γ. According to (18), (22)
and (26), we have the distribution of (△ĥH0Bp − △ĥH0Br ) and
(△ĥH1Bp −△ĥH1Br ) as
H0 : △ĥH0Bp −△ĥH0Br ∼ CN (0, (
σ2A
Np
+
σ2A
Nr
)IM ), (31)
H1 : △ĥH1Bp −△ĥH1Br ∼ CN (0, (
σ2A
Np
+
σ2A
Nr
+ PEβE)IM ).
(32)
Therefore, under H0, the distribution of T = ‖△ĥH0Bp −
△ĥH0Br‖2 is chi-square multiplying a coefficient C0:
T = C0T
′
0, (33)
T ′0 =
∥∥∥∥△ĥH0Bp−△ĥH0BrC0
∥∥∥∥2 ∼ χ22M , (34)
C0 =
1
2
(
σ2A
Np
+
σ2A
Nr
), (35)
where χ2
2M denotes the chi-squared distribution with degrees
of freedom 2M .
Similarly, under H1, the distribution of T = ‖△ĥH1Bp −
△ĥH1Br‖2 is
T = C1T
′
1, (36)
T ′1 =
∥∥∥∥△ĥH1Bp−△ĥH1BrC1
∥∥∥∥2 ∼ χ22M , (37)
C1 =
1
2
(
σ2A
Np
+
σ2A
Nr
+ PEβE). (38)
Given a threshold γ, we can derive the probability of false
alarm Pfa as
Pfa = Pr{T > γ|H0}
= Pr{T ′ > γ
C0
|H0}
=
∫ +∞
γ
C0
f(t)dt
= 1− F ( γ
C0
) (39)
where f(t) and F (t) are the probability density function (PDF)
and corresponding cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of χ2
2M , respectively. Similarly, with the threshold γ, the
probability of detection Pd of our proposed detector is
Pd = Pr{T > γ|H1}
= Pr{T ′ > γ
C1
|H1}
=
∫ +∞
γ
C1
f(t)dt
= 1− F ( γ
C1
). (40)
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Given a Pfa (or Pd), the corresponding threshold γ can
be obtained by calculating the inverse function of F ( γ
C0
) (or
F ( γ
C1
)).
D. Eve Attacks During Random Phase
Under the fore-mentioned assumption, Eve transmits noth-
ing during the random phase. However, obviously Eve can
also attack and transmit some signals during this phase, for
example Eve may transmit random bits or random Gaussian
noise. Here, we briefly explain how our detector works under
this case.
In this case, Bob transmits Nr random bits br(n) and Eve
transmits Nr different random signal bEr(n) at the same time
during the random phase. The received signal at Alice in the
nth time slot is
yr(n) =
√
PBhBbr(n) +
√
PErhEbEr(n) + ur(n) (41)
where
√
PEr is the power of the spoofing attack of Eve during
the random phase. Again, we rewrite it in the matrix form as
Yr =
√
PBhBb
T
r +
√
PErhEb
T
Er +Ur. (42)
Due to this attack, the legitimate channel estimation and the
random bit detection returned by the ILS algorithm may be
not accurate. Specifically, let b̂r be the detected random bit
vector returned by ILS. Then, The channel estimation result
ĥBr for H1 can be expressed as below
ĥBr =
1
Nr
√
PBhBb
T
r b̂r +
1
Nr
√
PErhEb
T
Erb̂r +
1
Nr
Urb̂r
= µ
√
PBhB + ν
√
PErhE +
1
Nr
Urb̂r (43)
where µ , 1
Nr
bTr b̂r, |µ| ≤ 1 and the equality holds if and
only if br = ±b̂r, i.e. the detection of br is correct. Similarly,
ν , 1
Nr
bTErb̂r, |ν| ≤ 1 and the equality holds if and only if
bEr = ±b̂r, in such case the ILS total failed and return the
detection of bEr instead.
Then, we can rewrite the difference between ĥBp and ĥBr
as
H0 : ĥBp − ĥBr = 1
Np
Upbp − 1
Nr
Urbr
H1 : ĥBp − ĥBr = 1
Np
Upbp − 1
Nr
Urb̂r
+(1− µ)
√
PBhB + (1 − ν)
√
PErhE .
Since br and bEr are independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.), br and bEr are quasi-orthogonal with sufficient length
of random bits. Due to this property, no matter what result
of b̂r returned by the ILS algorithm, |ν| and |µ| cannot
simultaneously have large value close to 1. Therefore, under
Eve’s attack during the random phase, the residual of the
channel estimation is still significant and our detector is
functional under this case.
TABLE II
ILS-BASED CHANNEL ESTIMATION ENHANCEMENT
Input: ĥBp , Yp, Yr .
Output: ĥBc .
1) d = 0; Yc = [Yp,Yr ].
2) Initialize ĥ(0)
Bc
= ĥBp.
3) d = d+ 1;
b̂
(d)
r = sgn
{
Re
[
(ĥ
(d−1)
Bc
)HYr
]}
;
b̂
(d)
c = [b
T
p , (b̂
(d)
r )
T ]T ;
ĥ
(d)
Bc
= 1
(Np+Nr)
Ycb̂
(d)
c .
4) Repeat Step 3) until ĥ(d)
Bc
= ĥ
(d−1)
Bc
.
IV. CHANNEL ESTIMATION ENHANCEMENT
If the spoofing detector indicates absence of any spoofing
attack, the channel estimations ĥBp and ĥBr are both reliable
for Alice to design the beamformer. However, it is well known
that larger number of pilot bits can provide more accurate
channel estimation. If we have the knowledge of the random
bits and use them together with the pilot bits to estimate the
channel, the accuracy will be further improved. Motivated
by this fact, in this section we introduce a computationally
efficient channel estimation enhancement algorithm.
We first use ĥBp obtained by the pilot bits to detect the
random bits
b̂r = sgn
{
Re
[
ĥHBpYr
]}
. (44)
After combining the pilot and random bits as b̂c =
[bTp , (b̂r)
T ]T , we then use b̂c to estimate the channel based
on the concatenated received data Yc = [Yp,Yr] from pilot
and random phases:
ĥBc =
1
(Np +Nr)
Ycb̂c. (45)
To further improve the accuracy, we iteratively execute the
random bits detection (44) and the channel estimation (45)
until convergence. The proposed ILS-based channel estimation
enhancement algorithm is summarized in Table II. Experimen-
tally, the number of executed iteration is 2 ∼ 4 in general.
The simulation results show that this simple channel estima-
tion enhancement can significantly improve the performance
comparing with using only Np pilot bits and can approach the
performance benchmark which uses (Np +Nr) pilot bits.
V. SECURE TRANSMISSION
If the spoofing detector indicates presence of pilot spoofing
attack, Alice can of course terminate the transmission imme-
diately. However, more wisely, she can adopt physical layer
security technology and launch the secure transmission. In this
section, we introduce a secure transmission method associated
with the proposed spoofing detection algorithm.
We recall that, with the presence of pilot spoofing attack,
the residual ĥBp − ĥBr has a form of
ĥBp − ĥBr =
√
PEhE +
1
Np
Upb
T
p −
1
Nr
Urb
T
r
=
√
PEhE + n˜ (46)
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where n˜ , 1
Np
Upb
T
p − 1NrUrbTr is the AWGN term and n˜ ∼
CN (0, (σ2A
Np
+
σ2A
Nr
)IM ). Thus, (46) implies that the (energy-
included) illegitimate channel can be estimated by
ĥE = ĥBp − ĥBr =
√
PEhE + n˜ (47)
which can be utilized in designing beamformer w and achiev-
ing the secure transmission in the physical layer security
concept.
The optimal beamforming design w in the context of
physical layer security is to maximize the secrecy rate Rs(w)
Rs(w) = [log(1 + SNRB)− log(1 + SNRE)]+ (48)
=
[
log
(
wH(I− φhBhHB )w
wH(I− ψhEhHE )w
)]+
(49)
where φ , PA/σ2B and ψ , PA/σ2E . The maximal secrecy
rate can be achieved by selecting the beamformer along
the direction of the generalized eigenvector of the matrix
pencil (I−φhBhHB , I−ψhEhHE ) corresponding to the largest
generalized eigenvalue [14]. However, we should be aware
that such optimal design requires the knowledge of hE , PE
and σ2E which are in general not always available for Alice1.
Considering this hurdle in the realistic applications, we turn to
seek a suboptimal but practical secure transmission solution.
As mentioned in [14], in the high SNR regime, the op-
timal direction approaches zero-forcing (ZF), i.e. hE⊥w.
Therefore, for the practical purpose, we attempt to design
beamformer w in a ZF manner, i.e. maximizing the SNRB =
PA‖ĥHBw‖2/σ2B while forcing the SNRE = PA‖ĥHEw‖2/σ2E
down to zero. This optimization problem can be formulated
as
w∗ZF = arg max
w∈CM
‖ĥHBw‖2 (50)
s. t. ‖ĥHEw‖2 = 0, (51)
‖w‖ = 1. (52)
The optimal solution of the optimization problem (50)-(52)
can be easily obtained as
w∗ZF =
(
I− ĥEĥHE /‖ĥE‖2
)
ĥB∥∥∥(I− ĥEĥHE /‖ĥE‖2) ĥB∥∥∥ . (53)
Notice that the secure beamforming design in (53) only
requires ĥB and ĥE which can be easily obtained as described
before and therefore is very practical. The simulation results
in the next Section illustrate that our proposed ZF-based
secure beamforming can significantly improve the secrecy rate
and achieve performance as good as the generalized eigen-
decomposition-based secure beamforming approach.
VI. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, extensive simulations are carried out to
illustrate the accuracy of our proposed spoofing detector as
well as verify our theoretical performance analysis. We will
1We recall (47) that the estimated illegitimate channel ĥE contains com-
ponents of both unknown power PE and unknown channel hE . We cannot
easily obtain them by decomposing ĥE .
demonstrate the spoofing detection performance for various
numbers of pilots, power budgets used by Eve, numbers of
antennas used by Alice. In all simulations, the small scale
fading vectors of the legitimate and illegitimate channels,
hB and hE , are modeled to be Rayleigh fading with the
channel vector comprising i.i.d. samples of a complex Gaus-
sian random variable with zero mean and unit variance. The
large scale fading coefficients are set as αB = αE = 1.
The AWGN powers at Alice, Bob, and Eve are fixed at
σ2A = σ
2
B = σ
2
E = 1. In all simulations, our proposed
algorithm uses the same number of pilot bits and random
bits, i.e. Np = Nr. The simulation results are derived from
106 channel realizations. We will first focus on demonstrating
the performance of our proposed algorithm itself, and then
compare it with other state-of-the-art spoofing detectors to
illustrate the advantage of our proposed algorithm.
In Fig. 4, we plot the “receiver operating characteristic”
(ROC) curves that show the probability of correct spoofing
detection Pd versus the probability of false alarm Pfa. In this
simulation, we fix the number of Alice’s antennas as M = 4,
the training power of Bob as PB = 10, and the spoofing
power of Eve as PE = 1. Three ROC curves of the proposed
algorithm are shown with different number of pilot bits (and
random bits), Np = Nr = 16, 32, and 64. The theoretical
performances obtained by (39) and (40) are also included to
verify our theoretical analysis. From Fig. 4 we can conclude
that our proposed detector is able to accurately identify the
pilot spoofing attack. Particularly, with sufficient pilot bits
Np = 64, our proposed spoofing detection can achieve higher
than 99.9% accuracy with the false alarm rate at Pfa = 0.001.
The simulation results also perfectly match the theoretical
performance analysis derived in (39) and (40). Moreover, as
we predicted, the larger number of pilot bits can dramatically
improve detection performance.
In order to illustrate the influence of the number of pilot
bits (and random bits), in Fig. 5 we carry out a similar
simulation to show the probability of correct detection of
our proposed algorithm versus the number of pilot bits Np
(number of random bits Nr). In this simulation, the power
of pilot and random signals is PB = 5, spoofing power is
PE = 1, the number of Alice’s antennas is M = 4. The
results illustrate that our proposed detector is very efficient
and requires only small number of pilot and random bits, for
exampleNp = Nr = 30, to accurately detect the pilot spoofing
attack.
Next, in Fig. 6 we show the probability of correct detection
as a function of the number of Alice’s antennas M . Clearly,
larger number of antennas, which can provide more spatial de-
grees of freedom and signal processing power, results in more
accurate spoofing detection performance but higher hardware
cost and complexity. With the moderate number of antennas,
for example M = 8, our proposed detector can achieve very
satisfactory spoofing detection performance.
In Fig. 7 we conduct the simulation to illustrate the per-
formance of our detector as a function of spoofing power PE
ranging from −20dB to 20dB. We set the number of Alice’s
antennas as M = 4, the pilot power PB = 5, the number
of pilot (random) bits as Np = Nr = 16, 32 and 64, and the
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Fig. 4. ROC curves of proposed spoofing detector (training power PB = 10,
spoofing power PE = 1, and number of Alice’s antennas M = 4).
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Fig. 5. Probability of correct detection Pd versus the number of the pilot
(random) bits Np (training power PB = 5, spoofing power PE = 1, and
number of Alice’s antennas M = 4).
probability of false alarm as Pfa = 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001, re-
spectively. From Fig. 7, we can conclude that more power Eve
spends on the pilot spoofing attack leads to higher probability
of correct spoofing detection. More importantly, even under
very weak spoofing signal, for example PE = −5dB, the
performance of our proposed spoofing detector is still higher
than 98% accuracy with sufficient number of pilot Np = 64.
In Fig. 8, we repeat the similar simulation as Fig. 7 and
include several other state-of-the-art detectors for the com-
parison purposes: i) Energy ratio (ER) based approach [22];
ii) self-contamination (SC) based approach [23]; iii) two-way
training (TWT) based approach [24]. Obviously, our proposed
spoofing detector significantly outperforms its competitors.
Next, for the sake of enhanced experimental credibility and
comparison results, in Fig. 9 we examine the ROC curves of
spoofing detectors with the same parameter settings. Again,
our proposed spoofing detector is superior to the competitors
in all false alarm rate ranges.
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Fig. 7. Probability of correct detection Pd versus the spoofing power PE
(training power PB = 5, and number of Alice’s antennas M = 4).
Now we turn to evaluate the performance of the proposed
channel estimation enhancement algorithm. In Fig. 10 we
show mean square error (MSE), which is defined as
MSE = E
{∥∥∥hB/‖hB‖ − ĥB/‖ĥB‖∥∥∥2} , (54)
versus the number of pilot (random) bits Np. Three channel
estimation methods are considered: i) Conventional channel
estimation (CCE) as in (5) with Np pilot bits; ii) CCE
with (Np + Nr) pilot bits which serves as the performance
benchmark; iii) our proposed channel estimation enhancement
(CEE) approach with Np pilot bits and Nr random bits. Again,
our CEE algorithm uses the same number of pilot bits and
random bits Np = Nr. As we can observe from Fig. 10,
our proposed CEE can significantly improve the performance
comparing with using only Np pilot bits and approaches the
performance benchmark.
Finally, we turn to evaluate the performance of the proposed
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secure transmission approach. Fig. 11 shows the ergodic
secrecy rate as a function of the transmission power PA.
The performances of five transmission schemes are illustrated:
i) Ordinary beamforming as in (6) without any secure ef-
fort; ii) generalized eigen-decomposition (GED)-based secure
beamforming with true channel which serves as the perfor-
mance benchmark; iii) GED-based secure beamforming with
estimated channel; iv) our proposed ZF-based secure beam-
forming with true channel; iv) our proposed ZF-based secure
beamforming with estimated channel. We can conclude from
Fig. 11 that our proposed ZF-based secure beamforming can
significantly improve the secrecy rate and achieve performance
as good as GED-based secure beamforming approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of detecting pilot
spoofing attack for a multi-input single-output (MISO) wiretap
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Fig. 10. MSE of channel estimation versus the number of the pilot (random)
bits Np (training power PB = 5, spoofing power PE = 1, and number of
Alice’s antennas M = 4).
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Fig. 11. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit power PA (training power
PB = 5, spoofing power PE = 1, and number of Alice’s antennas M = 4,
number of pilot (random) bits Np = Nr = 64).
system. We proposed a novel random-training-assisted (RTA)
spoofing detection scheme which examines the difference of
estimated legitimate channels during pilot phase and random
phase. Then, for no spoofing case, a simple channel estimation
enhancement algorithm was presented to further improve the
accuracy of channel estimation. Since the proposed RTA
spoofing detection algorithm can obtain the estimates of both
legitimate and illegitimate channels, we also introduced a
zero-forcing (ZF)-based secure transmission method when an
active eavesdropper is identified. Extensive simulation results
illustrated that our proposed RTA scheme can achieve accurate
pilot spoofing detection and its performance is superior to
other state-of-the-art detectors.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (8), (12) AND (14)
We first give the proof of (12) and then prove (8) and
(14) according to it. Given w = ĥB/‖ĥB‖, we formulate the
average SNR at Bob when Eve launches the spoofing attack
as
SNRB=EhB ,hE
{
PA‖hHBw‖2
σ2B
}
=
PA
σ2B
EhB ,hE
{
‖hHB ĥB‖2
‖ĥB‖2
}
=
PA
σ2B
· EhB ,hE{‖h
H
B ĥB‖2}
EhB ,hE‖ĥB‖2
. (55)
We first focus on the derivation of the numerator of (55).
Given
ĥB =
√
PBhB +
√
PEhE + nA (56)
with nA ∼ N (0, σ
2
A
Np
IM ), we have
EhB ,hE{‖hHB ĥB‖2}=EhB ,hE{‖hHB (
√
PBhB+
√
PEhE+nA)‖2}
=EhB{PBhHBhBhHBhB}+
EhB ,hE{PEhHBhEhHEhB}+
EhB{hHBnAnHAhB}. (57)
The first term in (57) is PBα2BM2, the second term in (57) is
EhB ,hE{PEhHBhEhHEhB}=PEEhB ,hE{Tr(hBhHBhEhHE )}
=PETr(EhB{hBhHB }EhE{hEhHE })
=PETr(αBIMαEIM )
=PEαBαEM, (58)
and the third term in (57) is
EhB{hHBnAnHAhB}=EhB{Tr(hBhHBnAnHA )}
=Tr(EhB{hBhHB }E{nAnHA })
=Tr(αBIM
σ2A
Np
IM )
=
MαBσ
2
A
Np
. (59)
Finally, the numerator of (55) becomes
EhB ,hE{‖hHB ĥB‖2} = PBα2BM2+PEαBαEM +
MαBσ
2
A
Np
.
(60)
Similarly, the dominator of (55) can be derived as
EhB ,hE‖ĥB‖2 = PBαBM + PEαEM +
Mσ2A
Np
. (61)
Applying (60) and (61) into (55), we finally obtain the
SNRB when Eve launches the spoofing attack as below
SNRB =
PAαB
σ2B
· MNPBαB +NPEαE + σ
2
A
NPBαB +NPEαE + σ2A
. (62)
Equation (12) is proved. 
In order to prove (8), we let PE = 0 in (62), then we obtain
the SNRB when Eve does not launch the spoofing attack as
below
SNRB =
PAαB
σ2B
· MNPBαB + σ
2
A
NPBαB + σ2A
. (63)
Equation (8) is proved. 
Similar to the proof of (12), we can obtain the proof of (14)
by simply changing all the αB , σB , PB , and PE in (62) into
αE , σE , PE , and PB , respectively. Then the SNRE when Eve
launches the spoofing attack has the expression as below
SNRE =
PAαE
σ2E
· MNPEαE +NPBαB + σ
2
A
NPEαE +NPBαB + σ2A
. (64)
Equation (14) is proved. 
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